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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILFORD LESLIE NEVES and 
GLORIA GAY NEVES, his wife 
-vs-
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
BRUCE EARL WRIGHT and 
SHONNIE C. WRIGHT, his wife 
Defendants and 
Appellants . 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16910 
The nature of the case was stated accurately by the 
appellants and need not be restated here. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable 
George E. Ballif, who entered judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff -respondents.buyers and against the defendant -appellants 
sellers. The Court in entering a Memorandum decision stated 
as follows: 
"The Court finds that the failure of the defendants 
to disclose the fact that they did not have title to 
the property at the time the contract was a breach 
of contract by defendants entitling plaintiffs to 
rescind the contract of sale. (Leavitt v. Blohm, 
11 U.Zd 220. The instant case is stronger on the 
facts because here defendant had no title at the 
time of the sale.)" 
The Court found at the Motion for Summary Judgment 
stage "that the defendants were out-of-title" 
(Rec • 112 : 15 -18) 
-1-
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The Court then awarded.to the Plaintiffs $3,000.00 plus 
the cash paid under the~contract less $200.00 per ~onth 
rental for the period of occupancy. Based upon such 
decision, the plaintiffs-respondents submitted a judg-
ment which included $1,918.00 attorney's fees and $604.SO 
interest. Defendants-appellants made a motion to strike 
the .attorney's fees. The.~motion was granted and after 
the ruling on attorney's fees, defendants-appellants 
filed their Notice of .Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The relief sought on appeal has been correctly 
stated and need not be restated here. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts given by the appellants is, 
in the most part, completely irrelevant and immaterial. 
Skipping page three· and most of page four brings us to 
the first full paragraph where the relevant facts begin. 
The plaintiff-respondents purchased a home from the 
defendant-appellant on a Uniform Real Estate Contract, the 
first copy of which was dated April 19, 1977 (Ex. 9, R. 
106:15-18) 
The defendants, Bruce E. Wright and Shonnie C. Wright, 
executed a Quit Claim Deed (Ex. 4) on April 11, 1977, 
conveying all of their interest in the property involved 
herein to a third party. 
On April 19, 1977, the plaintiff-respondents and 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant-appellants entered into a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (Ex. 9, Rec. 106:15-18). No disclosure was made 
to the plaintiff-respondents by the defendant-appellants 
that the sellers, in fact, had no legal title to the 
property they were selling. (Rec. 143:4-6). Plaintiffs 
took possession and began making payments upon the purchase 
contract to appellants and to First Security Bank, the 
first mortgage holder. 
On May 31, 1977, the parties, with a proper legal 
description, re-signed the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(Ex. Rec. 105:21-29) and executed an escrow agreement, 
(Ex. S). The appellants even signed a Warranty Deed on 
May 31, 1977 to the property they did not own (Ex.2) 
falsely and fraudulently warranting that they owned the 
property. 
During all of this time and through all of these 
contracts sellers failed to reveal to buyers that they 
had deeded the property to a third party. In February 
of 1978, plaintiff-respondents became aware through an 
examination of the County Recorder's Office that the 
defendant-appellants had conveyed the property to a 
third party. By this time respondents had paid appellants 
$7,555.44 for property respondents did not own. Through 
counsel, plaintiff-respondents sent notices that they 
were vacating the property, tendering the property back 
to the appellant-sellers and refusing to make further 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
payments. Plaintiff-respondents' letters were received 
in evidence as Exhibits 6, 7·and 8. Mr. Neves, the 
plaintiff-respondent, stated clearly that he would not 
have purchased the property if he had known that the 
title had been transferred. 
A •••• "Had I known the facts of the case, that he 
didn't-have a deed to the property, that only a 
week before he had deeded it to his parents, I 
would not have entered into the contract." (Re. 118 :4-8) 
The plaintiff-respondent then commenced an action to 
rescind the contract and for damages. The lower Court found 
for the plaintiff-respondent and granted damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS REPRESENTED AND WARRANTED 
THAT THEY OWNED THE PROPERTY WHICH REPRESENTATION 
WAS FALSE AND FRAUDULENT. SUCH A MATERIAL AND 
FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATION IS A BASIS FOR RECISSION 
OF THE CONTRACT BY THE BUYER. 
The defendants told plaintiffs they owned the proper· 
ty in question, represented that they owned the property 
in the two real estate contracts (Ex. 1 and 9) and war-
ranted that they owned it in the Warranty Deed dated May 
31, 1977 (Ex. 2). 
By conveying the property to a third party by Quit 
Claim Deed without any written reservation the defendant-
appellant transferred all of their interest in the pro-
perty, Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western, 95 Ut. 279, 
80 P.2d 338 also 112 Ut. 52, 185 P.2d 264. Clearly after 
defendant-respondent conveyed the property to a third 
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party by Quit Claim Deed they had no interest to sell 
and any attempt to sell something they didn't own was fraud. 
In the BYU Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol. 
1 Section 59 under the title of "Quality of Title the 
Vendee is to receive" we read: 
"Where mutual assent does not occur due to the pre-
sence of mistake, fraud, or undue influence, in 
establishing the contractual relationship, then the 
contract is never formed." 
Section 57-1-3 Utah Code Annotated states the re-
spondents had a right to rely on the document given them 
as evidence··of clear title. 
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to 
pass by·a conveyance of real estate, unless it 
appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate 
was in tende·d." 
The case of Elder v. Clawson, 14 Ut. 2d. 379, 384 
P. 2d 802 (1963) held purchasers could rescind for fraud 
when sellers failed to mention a quarantine for a noxious 
weed and held "silence may become actionable fraud where 
it relates to a material matter known to the party •••• " 
Certainly nothing could be more material then represen-
tations as to who actually owns the land being transferred. 
The plaintiff-respondent could rescind the contract and 
did. Section 8.60 states: 
"A party may claim the right to rescind a contract 
but to do so he must evidence intent to rescind 
by some unequivocal act, either by explicit notice 
or some act from which notice may be implied." 
In our case the plaintiff-respondents gave immediate 
notice of recission and vacated the premises as soon as 
-5-
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they discovered· the fraud. In.Frailey v. McGarry, 116 
Ut. 504, 211 P.2d 840, the Court acknowledged the right 
to rescind for false representations but held when the 
plaintiff delayed a year he, in effect, ratified the 
contract. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS HAD A RIGHT TO PRESUME 
THEY WERE PAYING FOR AND RECEIVING PROPERTY OWNED 
BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS AND THE FAILURE OF 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS TO DISCLOSE THE FACT THAT THEY 
DID NOT HAVE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME THE 
CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO WAS A BREACH OF CONTRACT 
BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS ENTITLING PLAINTIFF.:.RESPON-
DENTS TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE. 
The signing of a Uniform Real Estate Contract by 
the parties was a conveyance of the property. Section 
57-1-1 defines conveyance as follows: 
"The term 'conveyance' as used in this title shall 
be construed to embrace every instrument in writing 
by which any real estate, or interest in real estate, 
is created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assign-
ed, except wills, and leases for a term not exceed-
ing one year." 
The buyers in this case had the right to presume 
the defendant-appellant sellers had title to the property 
conveyed. Section 57-1-3 states: 
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intend~d to 
pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it 
appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate 
was intended." 
Any desire of the defendant-appellant sellers to give 
the property to someone else for whatever reason should be 
included in the conveyance document. The summary of Utah 
Real Property Law, Vol. I, Section 8.14 states: 
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"(l) A sim le absolute is 
terms. y es1re o t e ven or to retain a por-
tion of the estate or joint title, or give another 
portion, remainder or other joint title, to someone 
else should be included." (underlining added) 
A contract may be rescinded if the seller cannot con-
vey his title free·from all but agreed upon encumbrances. 
Section 8.15 states in part, as follows: 
"Generally, a contract may be rescinded if the vendor 
cannot convey his title free from all but mutually 
agreed upon encumbrances." (Thackery v. Knight, 
57 Ut.21, 192 P.263 (1920). 
The cases cited by the defendant-appellants to the 
effect that seller need not have a marketable title do 
not apply in our case. 
In all of the cases cited by the defendant-appellant 
only nominal defects were involved. Case Woodward v. 
Allen, 1 Ut. 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (1953), for instance, the 
purchaser signed an agreement in the evening then stopped 
payment on his check the next morning. The Court found 
the purchaser's complaint about a marketable title was 
an after thought being merely an attempt to get out of 
the contract. The seller had title but merely had some 
clouds on it to be cleared. There were no material 
defects nor were there any material representations involved. 
In the case Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Ut. 2d 220, 357 P. 2d 
190, both the trial court and the Supreme Court agreed on 
the same principal we (plaintiff-respondents) are contend-
ing here that purchaser has the right to rescind when 
seller, by conveying title, had clouded the title. The 
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trial court gave damagesto purchaser but the upper court, 
though agreeing that there was a right to rescind, equivo-
cated on damages because purchaser had not offered to 
return the property but merely moved out and abandoned the 
premises and did not even ask for return of money until 
the time for a counterclaim. The Court struck out the 
counterclaim Judgment to purchaser but affirmed the re-
cission. 
Even in cases where seller lost or gave up his title 
the cases uniformly hold the purchaser could rescind. In 
the case Marlowe v. Radmall, 26 Ut. 2d 124, 485 P. 2d 
1402, the Court held purchaser ~ould rescind: 
It is true that ordinarily such a vender does not 
necessarily have to have marketable title until the 
purchaser has made his payments. Nevertheless, if it 
plainly appears that he has so lost or encumbered 
his ownership or his title that he will not be able 
to fulfill his contract he cannot insist that the 
Purchaser continue to· make· ·p·ayments when it is obvious 
that his own performance will not be forthcoming." 
This case refers back to Leavitt case and cites Tremonton 
Investment v. Home, 59 Ut. 156, 202 P. 547; 55 Am Jur. 624, 
Vender and Purchaser, Sec. 154. 
In Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P. 2nd 520, (1978) the 
Court held that the seller breached the contract in not 
being able to convey the other half of the 80 acres 
contracted for by the purchaser. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS LOST ALL INTEREST IN THE 
REAL PROPERTY WHEN THEY CONVEYED IT BY A QUIT CLAIM 
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DEED AND NO SUCH THING AS AN ORAL TRUST OR ANY OTHER 
KIND OF SO-CALLED RESERVATION OF INTEREST IS VALID 
UNLESS THE ORAL TRUST OR RESERVATION OF INTEREST IS 
IN WRITING. 
A deed is a written instrument which.,when properly 
executed, conveys any interest in real property, 23 
Am. Jur. 2d Deeds Sec. 1. A Quit Claim Deed "will pass 
all rights, title, interest and estate of the granter at 
the date of the conveyance" Summary of Utah Real Property 
Law, Vol. 1 Chapter II Deeds Sec. 2.2; Ninx v. Tooele 
County, 101 Ut. 84, 118 P.2d 376 (1941) Ruthrauff v. Silver 
King Western (Supra). Such instruments are construed in 
favor of the grantee, Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 123 Ut. 
123, 255 P. 2d 989, 993 (1953). 
A DELIVERED RECORDED DEED TO 3rd PARTY FURTHER PRE-
CLUDED ALL CLAIM OF TITLE BY PLAINTIFFRESPONDENTS. 
The law says there must be a delivery of the deed to 
the grantee. In our case the deed was not only delivered 
by the Defendants to a 3rd party but the deed was record-
ed. The very purpose of recording is to give: 
"All subsequent·purchasers and mortgagees construc-
tive notice of the existence and contents of the 
recorded instruments." "A major premise of the law 
of real property is the rule that "first in time is 
first in right" "the first-created of two competing 
interest has priority". Sec. 2-.38 S.U.R.P.L. Also 
see Powell, The Law of Real Property, Sec. 912. 
"Constructive notice deals with title to land. Proper 
recordation gives all prospective subsequent grantees 
contructive notice of the existence and contents of 
the recorded instruments. In essence, there can be 
no subsequent bonafide purchaser·s he·cause anyone wish-
ing to be a grantee will be said to he ·an constructive 
notice of the deed since he has a duty to search the 
chain of title. A proper search will uncover a proper-
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ly recorded deed", S.U 0 R.:P.L. Sec. 2.40. 
Section 57-3-2~of the Utah Code provides: 
'.'Every conveyance, or instrument in writing affect-
ing real.estate, executed, or acknowledged or proved 
and certified, in the matter prescribed by this titl~ 
and every patent to lands within this state duly ' 
:xecuted and verified according to law, and every 
Judgment, order or decree of any court or record in 
this state, or a copy thereof, required by law to be 
recorded in the office of the county recorder, and 
every financing statement which complies with the 
provisions· of section 70A-9-402 shall, from the time 
of filing the same with the recorder for record, im-
part notice to all persons of the contents thereof; 
·and s·ubs·e· ue·n:t · ur·chaser mort agees and lienholders 
· shall ·to· · ur·c ase ta e· :no·tice." 
"To illustrate the above statute assume that 0 conveys 
to B. B records. 0 then conveys to C, who had no 
actual notice of the prior conveyance. B prevails 
over C because C was given constructive notice by 
proper recordation. "S.U.R.P.L. Se·c. 2.40. 
This illustration is identical to our case, 0 being the 
appellants-and C being the respondents. The appellants 
might just as well have sold the respondents the Brooklyn 
Bridge. In the end the respondents, C, would get nothing. 
Unfortunately respondents did not check the recorders 
office before signing the contracts but, fortunately, 
respondents did check the recorder's office before they 
had paid out more money to appellants who had no record-
ed title or interest in the property they were selling. 
ALL TERMS AFFECTING AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
MUST BE IN WRITING. AN ORAL TRUST IN A REAL 
PROPERTY TRANSACTION IS VOID. 
There was nothing on the appellant's Quit Claim Deed to 
the 3rd party indicating the 3rd party was to hold the 
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property in trust. -All agreements connected with real 
estate transactions must be in writing. Counsel for 
appellants has repeatedly referred to the agreement be-
tween appellants and the 3rd party was an "Oral Trust". 
Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, dealing with the 
Statute of Frauds, states as follows: 
"No estate or interest in real property, other than 
Teases for a term not exceeding one year, no·r any 
trust or ower over or concernin real r6 ~rt 
or 1n·any manner re at1ng t ereto, s a·· -~ ·~r~at~d, 
granted, ~ssigned, s~rrendered or declared otherwise 
than by act or operation of law, or by deed or con-
veyanc~ ·in writing subscribed by the party creating 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the 
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing." (underlining added) 
In fact the law says an oral agreement or oral trust not a 
part of the deed or a written contract is VOID. Section 
25-5-3 reads as follows: 
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer period 
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or 
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the con ... 
tract or some note or memo·randum there.of, 1s· 1n 
wr1t1ng subscribed by the partr by whom the lease 
or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent there-
unto authorized in writing." (underlining added) 
Section 57-1-6 discussing trusts and trustees states that 
recording real estate transactions is necessary to impart 
notice and states in part as follows: 
"Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as 
herein provided, recites only a nominal consideration, 
nor the fact that the grantee in such instrument is 
designated as trustee, or that the conveyance other-
wise p·urports to be in trust without naming the bene-
ficiaries or stating the terms of the trust, shall 
operate to charge any third person with notice of 
the interest of any person or persons not named in 
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such instrument or of the grantor or grantors; but 
the· · r·an:te·e· ·may ·co·nve· · the fe·e ·or such les·ser interest 
as· ·was· ·c·o·nveye· · ·to· · ·i·m y s·uc · ins trtime·nt ree· ·an 
· ·cTe·ar ·o'f aTl claims· ·not disclosed hy the "in:stniment 
·o·r· by ·an ins·tr·ume·n:t ·re·cor"ded as herein provided setting 
~orth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the 
i~terest claimed and describing the property charged 
with such· interest." (underlining added)': 
In other words the appellants could have conveyed to the 
3rd party by~writing in the trust relationship but since 
no trust relationship was established by the deed itself 
the grante·e-third party _could convey the property "free 
and clear of all claims not disclosed by the instrument". 
Sections 57-1-19 through 36 provide detailed instructions 
on trust sales. ··Having some 16 sections of law referring 
to trust arrangements shows how concerned Utah is about 
sales of real property connected with trust agreements. 
The appellants should have done two things which they did 
not do, that is: 
1. The appellants should have had such an agreement 
acknowledgment from 3rd Party before executing the 
Quit Claim Deed and preferably the agreement should 
have been part of the deed. 
2. The appellants should have advised the respondents 
of the Quit Claim Deed and trust arrangements before 
the contract signing so respondents would have "actual 
notice" of the document and arrangement. 
The respondents can only take a recorded document for 
its face value and had full right to avoid or rescind an 
agreement when the appellants sold them property which they 
represented they owned especially when the respondents 
had to find out, by their own investigation, that the 
appellants, in fact, had no title whatsoever to the properey 
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sold. 
The dangers of such a transfer, no matter what the 
intent is obvious. ¥If the appellants died the knowledge 
of an oral agreement dies with them and 3rd party owns the 
property free and clear. If the 3rd party died the property 
belongs to their estate clear and simply. The dead 
man statute precludes testimony concerning the intent of 
oral agreements·of the dead man. Even if the 3rd party 
decided to deny the oral agreement there would be serious 
problems. If creditors attached the property of the 3rd 
party, the oral agreement would be invalid. 
POINT IV 
ADMITTEDLY DEFENDANT -APPELLANTS TRANSFERRED THE 
PROPERTY TO 'A THIRD PARTY TO THWART CREDITORS. THE 
COURT SHOULD NOT REWARD THIS ATTEMPT TO DEFRAUD 
CREDITORS. 
By Defendants own admission the transfer to a 3rd 
party was to thwart creditors. Transfers to defraud 
creditors are Fraud and against Public policy. Section 
25-1-11 Utah Code Annotated states: 
"All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or assign 
ments, verbal or ~ritten, of goods, chattels, or 
things in action made in trust for the use of the 
person making the same shall be void as against the 
existing ·or subsequent creditors of such person." 
Obviously appellants should not seek equity in this 
Court because of their acts calculated to defraud credi-
tors. Certainly this court should not give credence to 
reasons behind the scenes for a transfer of property 
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when reasons were fraudulent and unlawful. 
POINT V 
DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY CALCULATED 
For damages the respondents should recover the 
$3,000.00 agreed value of the down payment for land given, 
plus the $2,000.00 additional down payment and the amount 
of $2,555.44 paid out in monthly payments for a total of 
$7,555.44 less reasonable rental value which the evidence 
shows was $200.00 per month for nine months or $1,800.00 
for a final total of $5,755.44 plus costs and interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents urge the Court to find that the facts 
which are not in dispute and the law support the decision 
of the trial court and pray the court deny the appeal 
and uphold the award of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted: 
~-A? 
KeitllE. Sohm 
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